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Abstract
In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with arti-
ficial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al.,
1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants’
probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in the
prediction game. We find increasing maximum prices the more coinciding
predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional
information is revealed by these predictions. Individual price patterns of
more than two thirds of the participants indicate that cascade behavior of
predecessors is not recognized.
JEL classification: C91, D81, D82
Keywords: information cascades, Bayes’ Rule, decision under risk and un-
certainty, experimental economics
1 introduction
Information cascades as modelled by Bikchandani et al. (1992), henceforth
BHW, have become a popular approach to explain herding behavior.1 The
BHW model offers explanations for many economic and social phenomena,
such as fashion trends and conformity in consumption or investment de-
cisions. BHW explain herding within a rational choice approach assuming
that agents update beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. The model shows that
in a choice situation under incomplete information it may be rational to fol-
low predecessors and to disregard one’s own private information. Hence a
cascade starts and no further information is aggregated in the observable
decisions. Agents may follow wrong decisions of predecessors even though
the aggregated private information would suggest the opposite. Individual
rationality may thus lead to market inefficiencies.
The BHW model implicitly assumes that agents recognize cascade behavior
of others. If not, perceived probabilities of making a good decision increase
with the length of the cascade even if no further information is aggregated.
Thus, boundedly rational behavior of agents would result in an overvalua-
tion of public information and thereby cause further economic distortions.
Consumers, for instance, might misinterpret the number of previous sales
of a specific product as a signal for quality. This could unreasonably in-
crease their willingness to pay for best-sellers compared to similar compet-
ing products. Promotion instruments that refer to the number of sales, e.g.
best-seller lists, could then be used for increasing demand or for selling at
higher prices.
Cascade phenomena have been the subject of numerous experimental stud-
ies. The predictions of the BHW model were confirmed in first experimen-
tal tests by Anderson and Holt (1997), henceforth AH. Following AH, most
studies investigate cascade behavior by varying the structure of available in-
formation or by selling costly private information.2 Conclusions are drawn
from subjects’ predictions and buying decisions. The results suggest that
individuals, if confronted with more complex decision tasks than in the orig-
inal AH experiment, tend to overestimate private information and thus to
deviate from the rational cascade pattern. Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004)
have observed that acquisition rates of costly signals are generally higher
than optimal, but decrease in ongoing cascades. Their results suggest that
subjects overestimate the error rates of their predecessors and that their
depth of reasoning is limited.3 The authors conclude that “... subjects learn
1For a survey of theoretical and empirical studies on information cascades see Bikchan-
dani et al. (1996).
2See, e.g., Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1998), Kraemer et al. (2006), Kraemer and Weber
(2001), Nöth and Weber (2003), Çelen and Kariv (2004), or Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004).
3Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) use a quantal response model for their analysis. The ex-
amination of errors by using quantal response models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998),
has become increasingly popular for explaining deviations from standard BHW model. For
other applications of quantal response equilibria to information cascade models see, e.g.,
Anderson and Holt (1997), Anderson (2001).
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from observing their predecessors’ decisions, but ... fail to realize that other
subjects also learn from observing their respective predecessors.”
Oberhammer and Stiehler (2002) investigate whether behavior in cascades
reflects Bayesian updating. In their simple symmetric design, even counting
leads to correct urn predictions if predecessors behave rationally.4 Using
the BDM procedure (Becker et al., 1964), they asked subjects to submit max-
imum prices they are willing to pay for participating in the prediction game.
These maximum prices are used as indicators of subjects’ probability per-
ceptions. This procedure allows testing the explanatory power of the stan-
dard BHW model as well as of cascade models in which errors of predeces-
sors are included in subjects’ updating process. The authors report prices
that increase in the number of predecessors. This price increase also occurs
in positions where rational predecessors would have ignored their private
signals, i.e., in which their decisions should not reveal additional informa-
tion. By including the assumption that subjects incorporate erroneous play
of predecessors, error models can account for the observed price increases.
However, the pattern could also be caused by subjects whose depth of rea-
soning is limited and who thus do not recognize cascade behavior of others.
The authors were unable to distinguish between these alternative explana-
tions. Moreover, the decision situations in which individuals had to decide
were endogenously determined, so that observing complete individual price
patterns was impossible.
To fill these two gaps is the aim of this study. It focuses on individual updat-
ing behavior in a cascade design similar to Oberhammer and Stiehler (2002).
Subjects are confronted with the same information structure and the BDM
mechanism is used to elicit prices as indicators of subjects’ probability per-
ceptions. However, we incorporate artificial agents as predecessors, who
follow a simple counting rule, thus predict according to BHW, and – by defi-
nition – never err. Using the strategy method, we ask subjects to state their
predictions and maximum prices for all possible decision situations. This
results in observing complete individual price setting patterns. By excluding
error making of predecessors as an explanation for the observed decisions,
we are able to address the question whether individuals recognize cascade
behavior of others in isolation.
We find that in these rather simple decision tasks, most subjects predict
according to theory (and to simple counting) but many submit increasing
maximum prices the more coinciding predictions of predecessors they ob-
serve, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these pre-
dictions. We conclude that the majority of participants do not recognize
cascade behavior of predecessors.
While we focus on the recognition of predecessors’ rational cascade behav-
ior, we do not negate that (assumed) erroneous play of human predecessors
4In the AH experiment, prediction errors increase up to 50 percent in asymmetric de-
cision situations where simple counting of predecessors’ predictions does not lead to a
correct urn prediction (Huck and Oechssler, 2000). In these situations the rule “follow
your own signal” offers better predictions than Bayesian updating. This result suggests
that subjects are not always able to apply Bayesian updating in complex decision tasks.
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also influenced subjects’ behavior in other experiments. As our artificial
agents never err, we most likely create beliefs about predecessors that are
different from those in experiments with human players. Therefore, it is
no surprise that the behavior observed in this experiment differs in some
aspects from behavior reported in other cascade studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the exper-
imental design and procedures are described. In Section 3 hypotheses are
derived for both rational behavior as assumed in the BHW model and behav-
ior based on the assumption that subjects do not recognize cascade behavior
of others. The results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 experimental design and procedure
2.1 Experimental scenario
There are two urns, A and B, with 5 balls each (3 black balls and 2 white
balls and vice versa). In each round of the game, one urn is randomly chosen
with equal probability at the beginning of the game. Participants predict the
randomly chosen urn. As participants’ private information a ball is drawn
from the urn and its color revealed. As public information, urn predictions
of predecessors (if any) are announced. Participants are credited 100 ECU
(Experimental Currency Units) for correct urn predictions and nothing oth-
erwise. Participants are further asked to submit maximum prices pmax they
are willing to pay to participate in the prediction game, i.e., to seize the op-
portunity of winning 100 ECU. As an incentive compatible mechanism to
elicit subjects’ maximum willingness to pay we implement the BDM mech-
anism (Becker et al., 1964): Subjects’ maximum prices are compared to a
random price pr , drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval [0,100].
If the random price exceeds the maximum price (pr > pmax), the partici-
pant earns nothing. If the random price is equal or lower than the maximum
price (pr ≤ pmax), the participant is credited the amount resulting from her
urn prediction minus the random price (see Table 1).
Correct urn prediction False urn prediction
pr ≤ pmax 100 ECU - pr 0 ECU - pr
pr > pmax 0 ECU 0 ECU
Table 1: Income calculation
If participants were risk neutral and maximized their income according
to standard expected utility theory, the submitted maximum prices would
perfectly reflect their winning probability perceptions. But these assump-
tions are hardly satisfied as many experimental studies on decision–making
show.5 However, we are not interested in absolute probability levels, but
5For surveys of experimental studies on individual decision making under risk and un-
certainty see ,e.g., Camerer (1995) or Hey (1991).
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only in qualitative results. Therefore, prices are a meaningful measure to
answer our research question if higher prices reflect higher probability per-
ceptions and vice versa. To check this, we do not only elicit maximum prices
but also ask subjects to submit subjective probabilities for the correctness
of their urn predictions.
2.2 Implementation of artificial agents
In this cascade experiment a subject’s predecessors are artificial agents,
whose predictions are clearly defined by simple counting, i.e., agents pre-
dict according to the majority of (public and private) signals in favor of urn
A or B. Consequently, errors of predecessors are excluded by definition.
Note that in the applied symmetrical information structure simple counting
leads to the same urn predictions as Bayesian updating (Anderson and Holt,
1997). Thus, urn predictions of artificial agents are in line with BHW. In case
of a tie-break, i.e., an equal number of signals in favor of urn A and B, arti-
ficial agents decide according to their private signal. This tie-breaking rule
simplifies the updating process compared to a randomization between urn
A and B, as assumed by BHW.
One may object that we influenced participants’ decisions by incorporating
artificial agents who followed a simple counting heuristic. Admittedly, we
taught participants to predict according to the BHW model. But note that
we are interested in price setting behavior rather than in urn predictions.
By the precise explanation of the artificial agents’ decision rule, we intended
to make it as easy as possible for subjects to recognize cascade behavior of
predecessors.
2.3 Use of the strategy method
Participants are asked to state their decisions for all situations that may
arise from the decisions made by up to 5 artificial predecessors. Depending
on
• the subject’s own position (1 to 6),
• the color of the privately drawn ball (black or white), and
• the history regarding predecessors’ predictions,
there are in total 74 decision situations (see Section 3.2) for which partici-
pants have to submit their urn predictions, maximum prices and subjective
probabilities. One of these 74 situations is determined to be payoff–relevant
as follows:
1. One urn (A or B) is randomly chosen.
2. Subjects’ position (1 to 6) is randomly determined.
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3. For each artificial agent a ball is drawn from the chosen urn. The agent
predicts according to the defined decision rules. This prediction is
publicly announced.
4. At the (real) subject’s position a ball is drawn and the color announced.
Then the random price is drawn from all integers between 0 and 100. Now
the payoffs from the experiment can be calculated according to the rules
summarized in Table 1. The implementation of the strategy method has
two major advantages: First, it allows observing complete individual price
patterns. Second, the strategy method causes “cold”, i.e., less emotional
responses than spontaneous play and thus helps us to focus on the partici-
pants’ ability to recognize cascade behavior of others.6
2.4 Procedure
At the start of a session participants were provided with written instructions
as well as with a supplementary sheet on the working of the BDM mecha-
nism demonstrating that strategic behavior does not pay.7 Questions were
answered privately during the experiment.
After reading the instructions it was demonstrated how the payoff–relevant
situation would be determined. While all decisions had to be submitted via
the computer, the choice of the payoff–relevant situation and the draw of the
random price were done by one of the participants by hand, using real urns
(opaque blue bags), balls (table tennis balls), dice, and chips with numbers
from 1 to 100.
Prior to the experiment participants answered some control questions about
the decision rules of artificial predecessors and the working of the price
mechanism. Subjects who answered all questions correctly in the first go
were credited 5e. Participants were not allowed to proceed to the experi-
ment before all questions were answered correctly.
In the experiment participants submitted their decisions for all 74 situa-
tions which were displayed on the computer screen in random order. After
the decisions were taken the payment relevant situation was determined,
the price was randomly chosen, and subjects were paid according to their
decisions.
By using real urns and balls and by the execution of random choices by par-
ticipants, by demonstrating the choice of the payment–relevant situation be-
fore the sessions started and by using pre-experimental control questions
we made sure that the structure of the experiment, the decision rules of arti-
ficial agents as well as the working of the BDM mechanism were understood
by the participants.
6For experimental studies on presentation effects see, e.g., Brandts and Charness (2000)
or Schotter et al. (1994).
7Instructions and control questions may be downloaded at http://www.hu-
berlin.de/wt1/papers.
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The computerized experiment (using the software toolkit z-Tree, Fischbacher,
1999), was conducted at Humboldt University at Berlin. We ran 4 sessions
with 9, 12, 7, and 11 participants. The 39 subjects, mainly business and
economics students, were randomly recruited from a pool of potential par-
ticipants. In order to avoid losses a show-up fee of 100 ECU was paid. The
experiment lasted about 80 minutes. 100 ECU were equivalent to e10. Av-
erage earnings amounted to approximately e17 on average.
3 theory, notation, and hypotheses
3.1 Bayes’ rule
In a symmetric cascade structure in which predecessors update information
in line with Bayes’ rule and predict according to their private signal in case of
a tie, posterior probabilities just depend on the number of signals in favor
of urns A and B. According to Anderson and Holt (1997), for the applied
design, these probabilities can be derived to be as follows:
Pr{A|d} =
1
1+
(
2
3
)d and Pr{B|d} =
1
1+
(
2
3
)−d (1)
Thereby, d is defined as the difference between the number of A and B sig-
nals. Posterior probabilities increase with an increasing difference in favor
of the respective urn. Thus, rational subjects would recognize that they
should ignore their own signal once a difference of d = 2(−2) can be in-
ferred from the predecessors’ predictions. From then on subsequent play-
ers would always predict according to the ongoing cascade even if their
private signal does not match the cascade, diminishing the difference to
d = 1(−1). Therefore, no further information can be inferred from their
predictions. Posterior probabilities for all further situations remain stable
at Pr{A|d = 3} = 0.77 if confronted with a signal in accordance with the
ongoing cascade or at Pr{A|d = 1} = 0.60 if confronted with an opposed
signal.
3.2 Notation
To describe and classify the different situations a subject may be confronted
with, we first introduce some notation. All possible situations in the decision
sequences will be characterized as follows: Predecessors’ predictions are
denoted by capital letters (A or B), private signals by small letters (a = black
ball and b = white ball). For example, ABb refers to a situation in which
a subject acts third in the sequence, sees a white ball as her private signal,
and observes that one of her predecessors (the first agent) has predicted “A,”
and one (the second agent) has predicted “B.” We denote these situations as
“decision situations.”
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We refer to private signals as either pro or contra signals. The naming is
based on what a rational player would do after observing the respective
signal: After observing a pro signal, the player predicts the urn suggested
by the signal (or is indifferent which urn to choose); after observing a contra
signal, she rationally predicts against it. Therefore, as long as no cascade
has started, all signals are pro signals, because no player rationally ignores
her signal.
We classify decision situations where no cascade has started yet as cascade
positions −3, −2, and −1. Cascade position −3 refers to a “balanced sam-
ple.” This means that predecessors’ decisions together with the private sig-
nal reveal a probability of 0.5 for each urn. Thus, either prediction is in line
with rational behavior. Cascade position −2 refers to decision situations in
which equally many predecessors have predicted either urn. This means that
predecessors’ decisions together with the private signal reveal a probability
of 0.6 for the urn indicated by the private signal. Finally, at cascade position
−1, among the predecessors, there is already a one–prediction majority for
one of the urns among the predecessors and the private signal matches that
majority. Hence, the probability for predicting correctly is 0.69.
We refer to a player’s position at which a cascade starts as cascade position
0. This means that a rational player at cascade position 0 is the first to ignore
her signal and predict in line with the majority of predecessors in any case.
Despite the fact that the optimal decision is unaffected by the private signal,
the probability of predicting correctly depends on whether she has observed
a pro or a contra signal.
Positions within the cascade are referred to as cascade positions 1, 2, and
3. This means that 1, 2, or 3 predecessors have already ignored their pri-
vate signal and have predicted according to the majority of predictions they
observed. Therefore there is no additional information revealed by their
predictions. Thus, the probabilities of predicting correctly after receiving a
pro or a contra signal at cascade positions 1, 2, or 3 equal those at cascade
position 0.
In total there are thus seven cascade positions. Remember that cascade
positions are not equivalent to the position in the decision sequence at which
a player acts. As an example, consider decision situations AAb and BAAAb
which both belong to cascade position 0.
In Table 2, all cascade positions and the corresponding decision situations
are summarized.
3.3 Hypotheses
Figure 1 shows a representation of posterior probabilities for all cascade
positions given pro or contra signals according to the BHW model.
As derived in Section 3.1, posterior probabilities of predicting correctly in-
crease between cascade positions −3 and −1. With the prediction of the
agent at cascade position 0, the cascade starts. From then on, probabilities
7
Private Casc. Decision Situations Number
Signal Pos.
−3 Ab;Ba;ABAb;ABBa;BAAb;BABa;ABABAb 14
ABABBa;ABBAAb;ABBABa;BABAAb
pro BABABa;BAABAb;BAABBa
−2 a;b;ABb;ABa;BAb;BAa;ABABb;ABABa;ABBAb 14
ABBAa;BAABb;BAABa;BABAb;BABAa
−1 Aa;Bb;ABAa;ABBb;BAAa;BABb;ABABAa;ABABBb 14
ABBAAa;ABBABb;BABAAa;BABABb;BAABAa;BAABBb
0 AAa;BBb;ABAAa;ABBBb;BAAAa;BABBb 6
pro 1 AAAa;BBBb;ABAAAa;BABBBb;ABBBBb;BAAAAa 6
2 AAAAa;BBBBb 2
3 AAAAAa;BBBBBb 2
0 AAb;BBa;ABAAb;ABBBa;BAAAb;BABBa 6
contra 1 AAAb;BBBa;ABAAAb;ABBBBa;BAAAAb;BABBBa 6
2 AAAAb;BBBBa 2
3 AAAAAb;BBBBBa 2
Total 74
Table 2: Decision situations
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Figure 1: Probability pattern according to the BHW model.
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Figure 2: Probability pattern according to the behavioral hypothesis.
remain constant. As for 38 out of 39 subjects (97.4%) we observe highly sig-
nificant positive correlations between maximum prices and subjective prob-
abilities,8 we are confident in using the submitted maximum prices to test
our hypotheses.9
Hypothesis according to the BHW model: Individuals update information
according to Bayes’ rule and take cascade behavior of others into account.
Price setting behavior at cascade positions −3 to 0 is as follows:
a) p
−3pro
max < p
−2pro
max < p
−1pro
max < p
0pro
max .
Price setting behavior at cascade positions 0 to 3 is as follows:
b) p
0pro
max = p
1pro
max = p
2pro
max = p
3pro
max ,
c) p0conmax = p
1con
max = p
2con
max = p
3con
max .
Thereby, e.g., we refer to p0conmax as the willingness to pay of a subject at
cascade position 0, who is confronted with a contra signal.
There are many studies indicating that individuals’ depth of reasoning is
limited.10 We thus conjecture that even though there is no uncertainty about
others’ decision–making, individuals do not recognize cascade behavior of
predecessors in our simple setting. If subjects ignore the formation of a
cascade, subjective probabilities increase the longer a cascade continues, as
illustrated in Figure 2. From this, we derive our alternative hypothesis.
8The Pearson correlation coefficient is significant on the 1%-level for all but one subjects.
All significant coefficients are between 0.44 and 0.96, with a median of 0.85. Thus, a
majority of subjects exhibit a nearly linear correlation. The non-parametric Spearman’s
rank-order correlation coefficient is significant on the 1%-level for all 39 subjects.
9This correlation does neither need to be perfect nor linear. If, e.g., subjects are risk
averse, it may be expected that the correlation exhibits a non-linear pattern.
10For depth of reasoning analyses in normal form games see, e.g., Ho et al. (1998) or
Nagel (1995). For information cascades, Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) have shown that
subjects’ depth of reasoning is limited. See our discussion in Section 1.
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Behavioral Hypothesis: Individuals update information according to Bayes’
rule, but do not recognize cascade behavior of others.
Price setting behavior at cascade positions -3 to 0 is as follows:
a) p
−3pro
max < p
−2pro
max < p
−1pro
max < p
0pro
max
Price setting behavior at cascade positions 0 to 3 is as follows:
b) p
0pro
max < p
1pro
max < p
2pro
max < p
3pro
max
c) p0conmax < p
1con
max < p
2con
max < p
3con
max
Both the BHW and the behavioral hypothesis predict increasing maximum
prices from cascade position −3 to cascade position 0. But they differ in the
predicted price patterns from cascade position 0 to 3.
4 results
4.1 Prediction behavior
The 39 subjects were independently asked to make decisions for 74 situa-
tions. The data file thus consists of 39× 74 = 2886 urn predictions, prices,
and subjective probabilities. 546 observations are from situations at cas-
cade position −3 where all predictions are consistent with BHW since the
posterior probability is 0.5. Of the remaining 2340 urn predictions 2268
(96.9%) are in line with BHW. 14 subjects (35.9%) predicted always in line
with the theory. The rate of seemingly rational predictors sharply increases
up to 82.1% (32 out of 39) if we include subjects who predicted in line with
the BHW in at least 95% of the relevant situations.11
As mentioned in Section 2, our experimental design and procedure indi-
rectly influence subjects to predict in line with BHW. Thus, the high rate of
predictions in line with Bayesian updating is not astonishing. Subjects fol-
lowed their own signal in 77.1% of all tie-breaking situations (with posterior
probabilities of 50%).12
At cascade positions 0 to 3 rational agents would follow their predecessors
even when confronted with a contra signal. However, the error rate in such
situations is essentially higher (6.7%) than in cases in which the signal co-
incides with the ongoing cascade (0.6%). In order to provide insight into
the structure of prediction errors in ongoing cascades, we compared error
rates at different cascade positions and summarized the results in Table 3.
When subjects are confronted with pro signals, error rates are similarly low
at cascade positions 0 to 3 (between 0.0% and 1.3%). When confronted with
11The remaining (incorrect) predictions do not seem to follow any systematic pattern. In
each of the relevant decision situations, one or two subjects made a mistake.
12This rate resembles the one in Oberhammer and Stiehler (2002) (79%), but is lower
than rates found in Anderson and Holt (1997) and Anderson (2001) (85.4% and 88.5%,
resp.). However, their design was different to Oberhammer and Stiehler’s and ours in a
number of characteristics, e.g., they conducted a pencil–and–paper experiment and used a
different signal precision.
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contra signals, the error rate at cascade position 0 is higher (12.8%) than at
later cascade positions.13
Subjects apparently overvalue their private information at early cascade po-
sitions but assign more weight to the sequence of predecessors’ predictions
the longer the cascade continues.
Cascade Number Number of errors [error rate] after...
position of cases pro signal contra signal
0 234 3 [1.3%] 30 [12.8%]
1 234 0 [0.0%] 11 [4.7%]
2 78 0 [0.0%] 0 [0.0%]
3 78 1 [1.3%] 1 [1.3%]
Total 626 4 [0.6%] 42 [6.7%]
Table 3: Prediction errors at different cascade positions
4.2 Price setting behavior and subjective probabilities
The question remains whether subjects who predict in line with BHW also
recognize that a cascade formation takes place. Thus, in the following, we
concentrate on predictions that were in line with BHW. For each of the 2812
correct predictions we have one maximum price for participating in the pre-
diction game and one subjective probability for making a correct prediction.
To give a first overview of price setting behavior for different cascade po-
sitions and private signals, we report average prices and probabilities for
each of the 11 different cascade position/signal combinations (7 cascade
positions with a pro signal and 4 with a contra signal).14 The aggregated
results are summarized in Table 4. Figure 3 illustrates the aggregated price
setting pattern.
As predicted by the BHW model and by our behavioral hypothesis, max-
imum prices increase from cascade position −3 to 0. When information
cascades form, the submitted prices at later cascade positions are higher
than at earlier positions. This is in line with our behavioral hypothesis. A
similar pattern can be observed for the subjective probabilities. At cascade
position 3, subjects’ average maximum prices and subjective probabilities
are higher than predicted by BHW.
As mentioned above, we observe that subjects associate higher probabilities
of predicting correctly with a higher willingness to pay for taking part in the
13This pattern of error rates is in line with the data of, e.g., Anderson and Holt (1997),
Anderson (2001), and Oberhammer and Stiehler (2002). However, the level of error rates
is higher in all those studies. This may be due to the fact that players distrust their human
predecessors and thus follow their own signal more often.
14For the analysis of price setting behavior we excluded observations of one subject
whose submitted maximum prices are apparently unsystematic and often on an invariantly
low level (85% of her maximum prices are below 10). However, including this observation
does not change our findings.
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Figure 3: Average prices for different cascade positions and private signals.
Private Casc. Individual avg. prices Subjective prob. (in %) Prob. according to...
signal pos. Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Behav. BHW
−3 32.9 35.6 18.6 46.2 49.6 8.0 50.0 50.0
pro −2 39.7 39.2 17.3 51.6 53.4 9.0 60.0 60.0
−1 53.1 53.9 17.9 61.8 62.9 9.3 69.2 69.2
0 59.5 60.4 20.2 67.8 68.3 11.1 77.1 77.1
pro 1 67.8 76.7 22.2 75.5 78.5 11.2 83.5 77.1
2 73.1 80.0 20.7 81.3 85.0 12.5 88.4 77.1
3 73.9 81.3 23.9 83.0 87.5 14.9 91.9 77.1
0 39.7 41.0 16.7 49.4 52.5 12.3 60.0 60.0
contra 1 50.8 50.8 20.5 60.1 61.2 12.9 69.2 60.0
2 55.5 58.3 23.6 65.9 67.5 15.6 77.1 60.0
3 63.8 70.3 25.9 74.9 77.5 16.7 83.5 60.0
Table 4: Price setting behavior and subjective probability statements
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prediction game. We also find that at each cascade position, average sub-
jective probabilities exceed average submitted maximum prices, indicating
that risk aversion plays a role. The difference between prices and subjec-
tive probabilities does not vary systematically over probability levels and
cascade positions.
In order to test our hypotheses, we ran nonparametric Friedman tests based
on individual average prices for each cascade position. Moreover, we used
the individual average prices to calculate the Spearman rank correlation co-
efficient for each of the three conjectured price/cascade position relation-
ships. The results are presented in Table 5.
Friedman test Spearman rank corr.
Hypothesis (H0) χ
2 (sign.) ρ (sign. 2-tailed)
a) p
−3pro
max = p
−2pro
max = p
−1pro
max = p
0pro
max 91.02 (.000) .482 (.000)
b) p
0pro
max = p
1pro
max = p
2pro
max = p
3pro
max 42.86 (.000) .272 (.001)
c) p0conmax = p
1con
max = p
2con
max = p
3con
max 64.45 (.000) .374 (.000)
Table 5: Friedman–tests and Spearman rank correlations for maximum
prices and cascade positions
Both statistical measures confirm that subjects generally infer information
from predecessors’ urn predictions (see row a). The H0-hypothesis that
prices are constant from cascade position −3 to 0 is rejected. Instead, we
observe a significantly positive relation (Spearman’s ρ > 0 with p < 0.01)
between submitted maximum prices and the respective cascade positions.
This finding is in line with Bayesian updating. However, all other hypotheses
derived from the BHW model are rejected (see rows b and c). We observe – in
line with the alternative (behavioral) hypothesis – significantly positive cor-
relation coefficients at cascade positions 0 to 3 if confronted with pro, resp.
contra signals. Applying the same tests to subjective probabilities instead
of prices yields the same results.
Observation I Aggregate price pattern
1. In situations where no information cascade has formed yet, the average
willingness to pay positively depends on the cascade position (−3 to 0).
This is in line with both the BHW model and the behavioral hypothesis.
2. The aggregated price setting pattern within cascades is in line with the
behavioral hypothesis, i.e., the correlation coefficients between average
maximum prices and the cascade position (0 to 3, for both pro and
contra signals) are significantly positive.
One may object that the price pattern may be due to the behavior of some
subjects who did not understand the rules of the game and/or the decision
rules of artificial agents.
To check whether this objection is justified, we applied the same analysis
to the subsample of subjects who predicted in line with BHW in more than
13
95% of the cases and answered all questions about artificial predecessors
correctly at first go.15
Our findings turn out to be robust. We find a similar price pattern for the
considered subsample, i.e., the hypothesis according to BHW has to be re-
jected in favor of our behavioral hypothesis.
The use of the strategy method does not only allow to analyze aggregate
behavior, but also to obtain complete individual price setting patterns. We
calculate Spearman rank correlation coefficients between submitted maxi-
mum prices and the respective cascade positions for each single participant.
As before, we analyze:
1. maximum prices at cascade positions −3 to 0,
2. maximum prices at cascade positions 0 to 3 if confronted with pro
signals,
3. maximum prices at cascade positions 0 to 3 if confronted with contra
signals.
According to the significance of the rank correlation coefficients (at the 5%
level), we classify subjects in the following four groups:
• BHW subjects: Those who exhibit a significantly positive correlation
between cascade positions and maximum prices at cascade positions
−3 to 0, but, for both pro and contra signals, no significant correlation
at cascade positions 0 to 3.
• Subjects completely ignoring the cascade formation: Those who ex-
hibit significantly positive correlations at cascade positions −3 to 0
and, for both pro and contra signals, also at cascade positions 0 to 3.
• Subjects partly ignoring the cascade formation: Those who exhibit
a significantly positive correlation at cascade positions −3 to 0 and,
either for pro or contra signals, also at cascade positions 0 to 3.
• Others: Subjects who do not exhibit a significantly positive correlation
at cascade positions −3 to 0 or who exhibit a significantly negative
correlation between prices and cascade positions, whose behavior is
thus not in line with either hypothesis.
The results are summarized in Table 6. For 17 subjects (43.6%), all three
correlation coefficients are significantly positive, i.e., completely in line with
the behavioral hypothesis. For another 10 subjects (25.6%), the correlation
coefficient is significantly positive at cascade positions -3 to 0, and, either
for pro or for contra signals, also at cascade positions 0 to 3. This indicates
15Note that some of these control questions referred to situations at which artificial
predecessors showed cascade behavior, i.e., predicted against their private signals.
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Identified groups Number Identified patterns*
of subj. % a) b) c) Number of subj.
BHW subjects 7 17.9 +   7
Subj. completely ignoring 17 43.6 + + + 17
the cascade formation
Subj. partly ignoring 10 25.6 + +  2
the cascade formation +  + 8
Others 5 12.8  + + 1
  + 1
   2
+ −  1
Total 39 100.0 39
*Identified price patterns at cascade positions −3 to 0 (column a) and at cascade
positions 0 to 3 when confronted with pro (column b), resp. contra signals (column c).
Significant positive (negative) correlations (p < 0.05, 2-tailed) between max. prices
and cascade positions are indicated by + (−), insignificant correlations by .
Table 6: Individual price patterns
that cascade behavior of predecessors is not consistently recognized. Only
for 7 of the 39 subjects (17.9%), all three correlation coefficients are in line
with the standard BHW model, i.e., significantly positive at cascade positions
−3 to 0, but insignificant at cascade positions 0 to 3. Finally, 5 subjects
exhibit a price setting behavior that is not in line with either hypothesis: 4
subjects show no significant positive correlation at cascade positions −3 to
0. One subject showed a negative correlation between prices and cascade
positions when confronted with pro signals. Overall, price setting behavior
of more than two thirds of the subjects indicates that cascade formation
is not consistently recognized whereas less than 20% of the subjects show
price setting patterns in line with the standard BHW model.
Observation II Individual price setting patterns
1. At cascade positions −3 to 0, almost 90% of participants exhibit a sig-
nificantly positive correlation between submitted maximum prices and
cascade positions, indicating that information revealed by predecessors’
urn predictions is taken into account.
2. Only 17.9% of subjects exhibit a price setting pattern in line with the
standard BHW model, i.e., a significantly positive correlation at cascade
positions −3 to 0 and no significant correlations at cascade positions 0
to 3.
3. For 43.6% of the participants, price setting patterns are completely in
line with the behavioral hypothesis, i.e., all 3 considered correlation co-
efficients are significantly positive. For more than two thirds of the sub-
jects price setting behavior is at least partly in line with the behavioral
hypothesis, i.e., the correlations are significantly positive for either pro
or contra signals at cascade positions 0 to 3.
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5 conclusion
We designed an experiment to test whether individuals recognize cascade
behavior of others. Our findings clearly support the alternative (behavioral)
hypothesis, that they do not. Although urn predictions are in line with BHW,
maximum prices increase the longer a cascade continues. More than two
thirds of the participants obviously ignore cascade behavior of predecessors.
In contrast, only 18% of participants set prices in line with the BHW model.
Participants in our experiment are informed about decision rules used by
artificial predecessors. Errors by predecessors are excluded. We are aware
that in real life there is uncertainty about behavior of others. Of course,
this may influence cascade behavior. But if individuals do not recognize
cascade behavior of others in our simple setting with artificial agents, then
it is unlikely that they do so when their predecessors are humans.
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